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LIm INSURANCE CONTRACT AS AFFECTED BY MISSTATEMENTS
OF INFANT APPLICANT-FRAuD AND AGENCY AS DEFENE.-In
O'Rourke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 Ati. Rptr.
834 (1902), Supreme Court of R. I., the defendant company
had issued a life insurance policy to the plaintiff's son, a boy
of fifteen years of age, in favor of the plaintiff, his mother. The
insured died and action was brought by plaintiff as beneficiary
for the amount due under the policy. It appeared that the in-
sured, in making the application, had fraudulently answered some
of the questions and the defence was that this fraud vitiated the
contract. On the ground that an infant was not liable for his
warranties nor for fraud arising out of contract, judgment was
rendered for plaintiff. On appeal judgment for plaintiff was
affirmed.
It is well settled that ordinarily such fraudulent warranties
would be fatal to the contract, but in this case there was the
further element of infancy and the question was whether an
NOTES.
infant is liable for his fraud in making a contract. It is true
that an infant is liable for his torts, but the right of action
always arises where an action ex delicto is maintainable and such
an action cannot be maintained where its basis sounds in contract.
Jennings v. Rundall, 8 D. and E. 335 (1797) ; Penrose v. Curren,
3 Rawle, 351 (1832). Therefore, it appears that an infant is not
liable for a tort rising out of contract or on which a contract is
based, and that infancy is a perfect defence to such an action re-
gardless of any further element of tort. But is an infant's con-
tract with the element of fraud on the part of the infant voidable
or void? If voidable then it is a defence for the infant only, and
the infant can both defend and enforce the contract, but if the
contract is void then the infant can only defend it and it cannot
be enforced by either party thereto.
Story on Contracts, § 111 (fifth ed.), says that while an infant
is not liable on such contracts, yet "if the infant have been guilty
of positive fraud, and thereby impose upon the other party to
his injury, he cannot set his infancy as a defence to an action
for the consideration, although the matter be in contract; for by
his fraud he has put himself without the pale of his privilege,
and is responsible to the same extent, as if he were an adult.
Fraud renders the contract- void ab initio, and not voidable; and,
therefore, if the infant, by fraudulent misrepresentations, deceive
the other party, and thereby induce him to part with his goods,
such an agreement will be utterly void, and the infant will be
liable to an action of trover for conversion. He cannot thereby
take advantage of his own wrong." Also see Clarke v. Cobley, 2
Cox 174 (1789).
On this ground the infant or his assigns could not enforce the
contract, for being void there was no contract to enforce, unless
the contract, subsequent to the fraud being discovered, was rati-
fled by the party defrauded or he was guilty of conduct incon-
sistent with his intention to disaffirm and which amounted to a
ratification.
Moncrieff on Fraud, p. 202, stateg that while certain contracts
of infants are valid, yet these contracts may be avoided by the
infant or the other contracting party on the ground of fraud
and misrepresentation and they are not voidable but absolutely
void.
Pollockc on Contracts (sixth ed.), p. 53, says that the decisions
appear to establish in infants' contracts only that the contract
cannot be enforced against the infant, or some other collateral
point equally consistent with it's being only voidable, except
where they show distinctly that the contract is voidable and not
void. He further says, however, that an infant who has mis-
represented himself as of full age is liable to restore any advan-
tage he has obtained by such representation. This is consistent
with the idea of the contract being void and not voidable, but it
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is to be noted that Pollock does not treat directly of infants!
contracts which are affected by fraud as an additional element.
Regardless of the law in Rhode Island and the facts which
were present in the case of O'Rourke v. John Hancock Mutual
L'fe Ins. Co., it would appear that an infant cannot profit by his
own wrong any, more than an adult. And further that the con-
tract being void ab initio, a beneficiary under the contract would
have no ground of action.
*In the case under discussion it also appeared that the agent of
the defendant insurance company wrote ot the application for
the applicant and that the applicant's mother, the plaintiff, stated
to said agent that the applicant had been previously rejected by
+his company, but she did not know what he wrote. It is well
established that a principal is bound by the knowledge of. his
agent while acting in the scope of his employment. Williard v.
Buckingham, 36 Conn. 395 (1870). It is also held that the
principal is bound by the knowledge of the agent, which was ac-
quired by the agent when not acting in the scope of his employ-
ment. Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. N. S. 466 (1864). The
question then is whether the agent in this case was the agent at
all of the insurance company or whether he was the agent of the
applicant in order to determine whether the defendant company
was actually defrauded.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 (1885),
the applicant made correct statements to an agent authorized to
solicit applications and the agent, without the knowledge of the
applicant, wrote down false answers, concealing the truth, which
answers were signed by the applicant without hdving read them.
The agent transmitted the application to the company and .the
company thereupon assumed the risk. Held that the assured
was presumed to have read such answers before signing them and
the policy was void.
In Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wallace, 222 (1871), the
correct answers were given but the agent wrote down false
answers. His conduct was a gross violation of duty, in fraud of
his principal, and in the interest of the other party. Held that
when an agent is apparently acting for his principal, but is really
acting for himself or third persons, and against his principal,
there is no agency in respect to that transaction; that the fraud
could not be perpetrated alone; the aid of the insured, either as
an accomplice or-as an instrument, was essential. And if the
assured participated in the fraud, then the contract is void.
In Lewis v. The Phcnix Mutual Life Ins. Co., .39, Conn. 100
(1872), the applicant negligently signed the application without
reading it or having it read to her. Held that this was inexcus-
able negligence. That the applicant was bound to know what she
signed. That the law requires that the insured shall not only, in
good faith, answer all the interrogatories correctly, but shall use
NOTES.
reasonable diligence to see that the answers are correctly written.
'That the insured had it in her power to prevent this species of
fraud and the insurer had not.
These cases show that the company is not bound by the acts
of its agent, and that the fraud having resulted either from the
ignorance or the negligence of the applicant, it is none the less
bis act and he is responsible. It seems that on these principles
where the fraud was not caused by ignorance or negligence
and not by the agent, but was the willful act of the applicant
himself, as in the case under discussion, there can be no doubt of
the applicants responsibility for the fraud.
Also in Athenaeum Life Insurance v. Pooley, 3 Deg. & J.
294, it was held that if a director make a contract in fraud of the
company, with a person cognizant of the fraud, such a contract is
void even in the hands of an assign for value who is totally inno-
cent of the fraud.
The Rhode Island decisions recognize the solicitor as being
the agent of the applicant. This was laid down in Wilson v.
Ins. Co., 4 R. I. 141 (1856). And on this ground it cannot be
said that the company was not defrauded. But it is not recog-
nized that the infant's wrong makes the contract void. It is
claimed that it is voidable only, and for this proposition the
court depends upon the case of Derocher v. Cotitinental Mills,
58 Me. 217 (1870), which case distinctly says that where the
contract is avoided the parties stand in exactly the same posi-
tion as though no contract ever existed and the infant may
recover the actual consideration. It does not say that the con-
tract may be enforced by the infant, but that the infant has his
rights and remedies as if there had been no contract at all.
See also Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572 (1837).
Therefore, it would seem that according to the general rule
and even the cases relied upon in O'Rourke v. The John Hancock
Mutual Ins. Co., the plaintiff should recover the premiums paid,
but should not be permitted to enforce the contract. Thereby
justice would be meted out to both parties, and they would
be placed in statu quo.
J.B.T.
